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Abstract 
The theoretical literature on a firm’s choice of debt maturity argues that a borrowing firm can 
signal its value in asymmetric information setting by borrowing short. This well-known fact is 
based on Flannery (1986). This paper questions the use of debt maturity as a signalling device. We 
demonstrate that Flannery’s (1986) signalling outcome is vulnerable on two accounts. First, the 
separating  equilibrium  established  by  Flannery  is  not  driven  by  the  incentive  compatibility. 
Second, derivations of the separating equilibrium appear to be vulnerable due to the lack of the 
refinements of pooling equilibria. If correct constraints are provided, the parameter space for the 
separating equilibrium shrinks, moderating the signalling role of debt maturity.  
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1.  Introduction
The theoretical literature on a firm’s choice of debt maturity argues that a borrowing 
firm can signal its value in an asymmetric information setting by borrowing short. 
This  well-known  fact  is  based  on  a  seminal  paper  by  Flannery  (1986).  Flannery 
argues that high-quality firms may signal their type by issuing short-term debt when 
debt issue entails  positive  transaction costs.  Flannery’s  (1986)  model is still very 
popular in the debt maturity literature and provides a critical theoretical reference to 
many  recent  empirical  studies  that  deal  with  debt  market  segmentation  across 
borrowers by means of debt maturity (Berger, et. al. 2004, Scherr and Hulburt, 2001, 
Guedes and Opler, 1996, Stohs and Mauer, 1996, Mitchell, 1993). However, these 
empirical studies provide little empirical evidence for the use of debt maturity as a 
signalling device. 
This note, in line with recent empirical evidence, questions the theoretical relevance 
of debt maturity as a signalling device. The main argument we make is that Flannery 
(1986) is much too positive about the probability that a signalling equilibrium will 
result if a firm uses its debt maturity to signal its value.  Flannery derives parameter 
restrictions for different types of equilibria (pooling and separating) by comparing the 
equity  value  of  firms  under  different  pooling  possibilities  and  under  a  candidate 
separating equilibrium. However, the analysis of Flannery suffers from the lack of 
incentive compatibility constraints and of the refinements of pooling equilibria in 
deriving a signalling separating equilibrium. In this note we will show that adding 
correct constraints to the model by Flannery will shrink the parameter space for which 
a separating equilibrium exists.  Consequently, the use of debt maturity as a signalling 
device is questionable.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a review of Flannery’s (1986) 
model with the focus on how the signalling separating equilibrium arises. Section 3 
analyzes the weakness of the Flannery’s signalling outcome and accordingly sets out 
the  relevance  of  incentive  compatibility.  Section  4  introduces  a  model  extension, 
which  aims  to  derive  the  correct  signalling  outcome  based  on  the  incentive   3 
compatibility  constraints  and  other  relevant  refinements.  In  this  section,  we  also 
discuss  the  relevant  implications  of  our  analysis  to  Flannery’s  work.    Section  5 
concludes the paper. 
2.  Review of Flannery’s (1986) model  
 In  a  seminal  paper,  Flannery  (1986)  examines  debt  maturity  as  a  signalling 
instrument under asymmetric information. In effect, he analyzes the choice of debt 
maturity under several different settings of information and transaction costs, e.g. 
perfection information versus asymmetric information, zero transaction costs versus 
positive transaction costs and partial endogenous transaction costs. For the purpose of 
this paper, we focus on the case in which positive transaction costs and asymmetric 
information are assumed.  
2.1 The model setup 
Flannery considers a wealth-constrained entrepreneur who is endowed with a risky 
investment project, which lasts for two periods.  The project can be financed with 
short-term (one period) or long-term (two periods) debt. If the investment project is 
carried out, all cash flows will occur at the end of period 2. All investment projects 
require an amount D of investment, and hence external financing of D is needed. 
During each period the project can increase in value with a probability p and decrease 
in value with a probability (1-p). The project’s value follows a binomial process as 
illustrated by figure 1. Since the time-state values M1 through M5 are identical for all 
projects,  project’s  “up”  probability  determines  its  probability  of  default  on  debt 
maturing at t = 2. At t=0, all lenders and the entrepreneur know that the project’s 
liquidation value at t=2 will be M3 with probability p
2, M4 with probability 2p(1-p) 
and M5 = 0 with probability (1-p)
 2. All the project’s time-state values except for M5 
are sufficient to repay D.  
There are two types of projects that differ in their “up” probabilities. Let us denote pg 
and pb as the probability of success for the good quality project and the low quality 
project, respectively, or analogously for the Good firm and the Bad firm, respectively.   4 
Under information asymmetries, lenders only know that q percent of all projects (and 
firms) are good, while the “up” probability of a certain project remains privately-
known to the entrepreneur endowed with the project. Thus, lenders face a problem of 
pre-contract asymmetric information and adverse selection, where they fail to identify 
a particular borrower’s quality at any cost. Presumably, both types of firms can apply 
for short- or long-term debt, knowing that they have to pay extra transaction cost for 










Figure 1. Time-state profile of Flannery’s (1986) model (M indicates project and firm 
value) 
In such a situation, the choice of debt maturity can play a role in signalling the true 
quality of firms to the lenders. Flannery argues that it may be in the interest of firms 
with good projects to borrow short in order to signal their superiority. If they do so, 
according to Flannery, a separating equilibrium results in which high quality firms 
issue short term debt while low quality firms issue long-term debt.  
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2.2 Alternative borrowing strategies 
In  deriving  conditions  for  the  separating  equilibrium,  Flannery  derives  the  equity 
value for both types of firms under alternative borrowing strategies, following the 
binomial process as depicted in figure 1. 
If a firm i,  { } , i g b Î  borrows long the valuation of its equity (Vli) equals 
(1) 
2 2
3 4 ( ) 2 (1 )( ) (1 ) 0 li i lic i i li i V p M DR p p M DR p c = - + - - + - -  
2
3 4 2 (1 ) (2 ) i i i i i li p M p p M p p DR c = + - - - -  
where Rli is the interest rate
1 on long-term debt for firm i and  c is the transaction cost 
of long-term debt.   
If a firm i,  { } , i g b Î  uses short-run debt, the valuation (Vsi ) equals 
(2)
2( ) (1 )( ) (1 )( ) 2 3 4 4
2 2 (1 ) (1 ) 2 3 4
V p M D p p M D p p M DR c si i i i i si i
p M p M p p D p p DR c i i i i i si i
= - + - - + - - -
= + - - - - -
  
where Rsi is the interest rate
2 on short-term debt for firm i, and 2c is the transaction 
cost of short-term debt.   
Under asymmetric information, the decisions on the borrowing strategy of firms will 
result  in  two  types  of  equilibria:  separating  and  pooling.  Under  the  separating 
equilibrium, loans are correctly priced and interest rates should be the same as in the 
case of perfect information. From Flannery’s (2) and (3) on his page 23, the short- 
and long-term interest rates are derived as: 
                                                            
1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ 
2 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿   6 
(3) 
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D M p
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- -
= + - ￿ =  
By substituting (3), and (4) in (1) and (2), respectively, the equity value for a firm i 
using short or long-term debt can be simplified to:  
(5) 
2 2
3 4 5 2 (1 ) (1 )
S
li i i i i i V p M p p M p M D c V c = + - + - - - = -  
(6)
2 2
3 4 5 2 (1 ) (1 ) 2 2
S
si i i i i i V p M p p M p M D c V c = + - + - - - = -  
Where 
S
li V and 
S
si V represent the equity value of a firm of type i under separation; in 
Flannery’s language Vi refers to the “intrinsic” value that a firm of type i can achieve 
under the full information regime exclusive of the related transaction cost incurred.  
Under the pooling equilibrium, from Flannery’s (4) on page 23, the long pooling 
interest rate RlP is  
2 (1 ) 5
2 2 ( ) ( )
D M E p
DRlP




which can be rewritten as 
(7) 
2 2 (1 ) (1 )(1 ) 5
(2 ) (1 )(2 )
D M p p g b
RlP
D p p p p g g b b
q q
q q
￿ ￿ - - + - - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ =
￿ ￿ - + - - ￿ ￿
 
and from Flannery’s (5) on page 24, the short pooling interest rate RsP is    7 
 
2 (1 ( )) (1 ) 5
2 ( ) ( )
E p M E p
DRsP




or rewritten as 
(8)
2 2 ( (1 ) ) (1 ) (1 )(1 ) 5
(1 ) (1 )(1 )
D D p p M p p g b g b
RsP
D p p p p g g b b
q q q q
q q
￿ ￿ - + - - - + - - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ =
￿ ￿ - + - - ￿ ￿
    
Note that the symbol E denotes expectations conditional on investors’ knowledge of 
the  true  distribution  of  firm  quality,  thereby  reflecting  the  average  borrower 
quality ( ) (1 ) E p p p g b q q = + - . 
By substituting (7) and (8) in (1) and (2), respectively, the equity value for a firm i 
using short or long-term debt under a pooling strategy can be reduced to:  
 (9)
2 2
3 4 5 2 (1 ) (1 ) ( ) ( )
P mis mis
li i i i i l i l V p M p p M p M D V i c V V i c ￿ ￿ = + - + - - + - = + - ￿ ￿  
(10) 
2 2
3 4 5 2 (1 ) (1 ) ( ) 2 ( ) 2
P mis mis
si i i i i s i s V p M p p M p M D V i c V V i c ￿ ￿ = + - + - - + - = + - ￿ ￿  
In these expressions, 
P
li V  and 
P
si V denote the equity values of firm i under for long and 
short  pooling  equilibria;  ( )
mis
l V i  and  ( )
mis
s V i   measure  a firm  i’s  “misinformation 
value” arisen from such long and  short pooling equilibria. These “misinformation 
values”,  according  to  Flannery,  stem  from  the  fact  that  in  a  pooling  debt  market 
equilibrium  insiders  and  outsiders  differ  in  their  assessment  of  the  firm’s  “up” 
probabilities. In other words,  ( )
mis
l V i  and  ( )
mis
s V i   represent the differences in equity 
values of a firm of type i between a pooling strategy and a separating strategy.  
  From his (7) and (9) on page 25 of Flannery’s article, these misinformation values 
are derived as: 
(11)
2 2 2( ( ) ) ( ( )
( ) ( ) 5 2 2 ( ) ( )
E p p p E p
mis V i D M l E p E p
￿ ￿ - + - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ = -
-
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(12)
2 (1 ) ( ( ) ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( 5)
2 ( ) ( )
p E p p p E p E p b b b mis V i D M s
E p E p
￿ ￿ - - + - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ = -
-
 
and  ( ) ( ) 0 mis mis V g V g s l < <   
  ( ) ( ) 0 mis mis V b V b s l > >  
Combining  equity  values  of  both  types  of  firms  under  alternative  borrowing 
strategies, Flannery constructs a matrix indicating the net benefits from alternative 
choices, see his table 1 on page 29. To keep track of our subsequent analysis, we 
present here the equity value corresponding to each borrowing plan by Good firms 
and Bad firms. 
Table 1. Alternative borrowing strategies in Flannery’s (1986) model 
Bad Firms’ Choice 
  Borrowing Short  Borrowing Long 
Borrowing 
Short 
1: Short Pooling 
 
Good firms:  
( ) 2
P mis




sb b s V V V b c = + -  





sg g V V c = -  
Bad firms: 
S










3: Separating (?) 
 
Good firms:  
S




sb b V V c = -  
 
4: Long Pooling  
 
Good firms: 
  ( )
P m is
lg g l V V V g c = + -  
Bad firms: 
  ( )
P mis
lb b l V V V b c = + -    9 
 
2.3 Derivation of a signalling equilibrium. 
The key concept underlying Flannery’s analysis of the behaviours of Good and Bad 
firms is that Good firms take the first move, and accordingly Bad firms react as a 
response to the Good firms’ choice. There are only two possible responses by Bad 
firms, either following the strategy of Good firms or choosing an alternative one. In 
equilibrium,  firms  of  both  types  should  opt  for  the  strategy  that  offers  them  the 
highest value, given the other firm type’s reaction.  
If Good firms borrow long, Bad firms will always follow, resulting in a long pooling 
equilibrium. This situation is straightforward from the table as one compares cells (3) 
and (4) for Bad firms’ equity value (
S P
sb lb V V < ). This outcome constitutes result II of 
Flannery on his page 29. If Good firms borrow short, the reaction of Bad firms is 
unclear beforehand as can be seen from cells (1) and (2) for Bad firms’ equity value 
( ?
P S
sb lb V or V < > ). Hence a pooling or a separating outcome may result. Moreover, the 
choice of Good firms toward borrowing long or short is also indeterminate. 
Flannery  argues  that  a  separating  equilibrium  may  emerge  when  Good  firms  are 
willing to bear the added transaction cost associated with short-term debt and at the 
same time Bad firms are unwilling or unable to mimic such a costly behaviour. Thus, 
such a separation is warranted under certain conditions.  
For Good firms to prefer short-term debt over long-term debt (and hence the resulting 
long  pooling  equilibrium),  the  value  of  Good  firms  with  short-term  debt  at  a 
separating strategy (cell 2) should be higher than that of Good firms under a long 
pooling strategy (cell 4):  
(13)
S P
sg lg V V >    10
This leads to Flannery’s condition (14) on page 30:  ( )
mis
l c V g - >  or  ( )
mis
l c V g <  
since  ( ) 0
mis
l V g £  
Reacting to the choice of borrowing short by Good firms, Bad firms may be induced 
to self-select long-term debt rather than misrepresenting Good firms at a short pooling 
strategy.  This  outcome  arises  if  the  value  of  Bad  firms  with  long-term  debt  at  a 
separating strategy (cell 2) is higher than the value of Bad firms with short-term debt 
at a pooling strategy (cell 1):  
(14) 
S P
lb sb V V >  
This comes down to Flannery’s condition (12) on page 29:   ( )
mis
s V b c <  
The combination of (13) and (14) thus simplifies to:   
(15)  ( ) ( )
mis mis
s l V b c V g < <  
Flannery concludes that a separating equilibrium exists if condition (15) is satisfied. 
Intuitively, the condition guarantees that it is in Good firms’ interest to incur the cost 
c by borrowing short rather than suffering a loss ( )
mis
l V g  in a long pooling strategy. 
At the same time, it is prohibitively expensive for Bad firms to incur the cost c and 
receive  ( )
mis
s V b  in return at a short pooling strategy. As a result, Good firms opt for 
costly  short-term  debt  and  Bad  firms  borrow  long,  and  a  separating  signalling 
equilibrium emerges. 
For a comparison purpose with the analysis we will provide in section 3, we rewrite 
condition (15) by fitting the definitions for 
mis
lg V  , 
mis
sb V ,  RlP and  RsP  given by our 
expressions  (11),  (12),  (7)  and  (8),  respectively.    This  reduces  to  the  following 
condition denoted as C1   11
 (16) C1   C c C l h £ £  
Where 
2 (1 ) (1 ) 5 C D p M p D p p DR l b b b b sP = - - - - -  
2 (2 ) (1 ) 5 C p p DR D p M h g g lP g = - - + -  
Ch  and  Cl  represent  the  lower  boundary  and  the  upper  boundary  of  cost  level,  
respectively. As argued by Flannery, condition C1 provides the threshold values for 
the extra transaction cost of short-term debt such that both Good and Bad firms prefer 
a separating strategy over a pooling strategy. The implicit assumption here is that 
firms of both types are identified as a “pooled” type and thus are charged a pooling 
interest rate once they resign from a separating strategy. Flannery concludes that if 
C1 holds, a separating equilibrium arises and hence a signalling mechanism works: 
Good firms borrow costly short-term debt to signal their superiority while Bad firms 
always borrow long-term debt.   
3.  The relevance of incentive compatibility constraints  
In  this  section,  we  attempt  to  reconsider  Flannery’s  model  with  respect  to  his 
separating  equilibrium.  We  prove  that  Flannery  omits  the  incentive  compatibility 
constraints in deriving his separating equilibrium. In other words, the condition of 
Flannery under which his separating equilibrium arises is not sufficient, since it does 
not  satisfy  the  incentive  compatibility  requirement.  Consequently,  his  conclusion 
regarding the signalling outcome is incorrect on this account.   
3.1 The Incentive Compatibility Constraints and a Separating Equilibrium. 
We repeat the setup of Flannery’s model in a way that allows us to pinpoint the 
necessity of incentive compatibility constraints.     12
There are two types of firms, good (g) and bad (b) seeking funds in the debt market to 
finance their investment project. Denote type of firm  { } , i g b Î  these firms differ in 
their “up” probabilities – probabilities of success of their project pi, assuming that pg 
> pb. Under the asymmetric information setting, the market only knows ex-ante the 
overall distribution of firms, i.e. a fraction q of firms are Good firms. The strategy t of 
a firm i is the debt maturity that it chooses; a firm can choose { } , t l s Î , i.e. long-term 
debt and short-term debt, so a firm’s choice is denoted as ti=l or ti=s. A priori, firms 
know that they have to pay extra transaction cost c if they issue short-term debt. The 
interest rate that a firm has to pay depends on the belief that the market has for the 
type firm it faces.  Denote the market’s belief with respect to Good firms is ￿. Upon 
observing a strategy t, i.e. the debt maturity chosen by the firm, the market induces 
the belief about the type of firm ￿= ￿(t) and accordingly sets the interest rate for that 
type.  
This situation is considered as a signalling game with debt maturity choice. The core 
of a signalling game is to solve for a separating equilibrium (Bolton&Dewatripont, p. 
103). By definition, in a separating equilibrium, the observed signal, which is the 
choice of debt maturity under this framework, should exactly reflect the firm’s type; 
that is each type of firms chooses a different debt maturity g b t t ¹ . Observing the 
signal, the market can thus infer the type of firm: ￿(tg)=1 and ￿(tb)=0. In a pooling 
equilibrium, the same strategy is chosen by both types,  g b t t = , so the market infers 
every firm as a “pooled” type  ( ) i t r q = . Payoffs of a firm i are dependent upon its 
strategy and the respective belief of the market. Denote these payoffs as ( , ( )) i i i t t p r . 
In essence of Flannery’s analysis, payoffs are the equity value of the borrowing firm, 
which is determined by the chosen debt maturity, the related transaction cost it has to 
pay and the interest rate required by the market. 
For a separating equilibrium to be incentive compatible, the following conditions 
should hold.    13
( , ( )) ( , ( )) g g g g b b t t t t p r p r ³  
( , ( )) ( , ( )) b b b b g g t t t t p r p r ³  
There conditions are known as the incentive compatibility constraints (ICCs). The left 
hand sides indicate the true payoff of a firm i given its own borrowing strategy, while 
the right hand sides reflect the firm’s putative payoff given its mimicking strategy 
designed for the other firm type. Fitting the beliefs of the market as previously 
specified, these ICCs are formulated as: 
( ,1) ( ,0)
( ,0) ( ,1)
g g g b








ICCs ensure firms to be honest about their type in separation, i.e. the ICCs induce 
firms to prefer their own strategy rather than coveting a choice of the other type.  
3.2 An Omission in Flannery’s Analysis and the Correction 
We now turn to derive a missing point in Flannery’s analysis with respect to his 
conditions  for  the  separating  equilibrium.  In  the  framework  of  Flannery’s  model, 
there  are  two  candidates  for  a  separating  equilibrium:    one  entails  Good  firms 
borrowing short and Bad firms borrowing long, while the other involves the inverse 
strategy. Intuitively, the latter candidate separating equilibrium cannot occur given 
that short-term debt is costly and therefore, Bad firms will only accept the strategy 
that coincides with their full information strategy – borrowing long. Consequently, 
only the former candidate is qualified as a candidate for a separating equilibrium. 
Flannery claims that a separating equilibrium exists if the value of firms under a 
separating equilibrium is higher the value under a pooling equilibrium as derived in 













sg V and 
S
lb V  denote the value of Good firms and Bad firms under separation, 
respectively with Good firms borrowing short and Bad firms borrowing long;
P
lg V and 
P
sb V denote value of Good firms under a long pooling strategy and of Bad firms under 
a short pooling strategy, respectively. 
In terms of payoff functions that we have specified, this condition can be rewritten as: 
( ,1) ( , )











Flannery assumes that if a firm deviates from a separating equilibrium, the firm will 
be assigned to a pooling equilibrium, and hence inducing the market beliefr q = . His 
argument holds if a firm chooses its strategy only as a best-response to the other firm 
type’s strategy. In the context of a signalling model, this argumentation however, 
appears  to  be invalid.  Equilibrium  requires  that  the  strategy  of  each  firm  type  is 
profit-maximizing, given the strategy of the other firm type and given the beliefs of 
the  market  (Bolton  &  Dewatripont,  2005,  p.  102).  In  essence  of  this  model,  the 
market consequently sets the interest rate based on such a belief. Therefore, it is vital 
to consider the market’s beliefs in deriving a separating equilibrium.  
As discussed, the separating equilibrium, if existent, entails Good firms borrowing 
short and Bad firms borrowing long.  Upon observing a deviating action from the 
separating equilibrium, the market will infer that such an action would only be set by 
the other type of firms.  Hence, the market will conclude that it faces the other type 
with certainty.  Now the correct conditions for the separating equilibrium to arise are:   15
(17) ( ,1) ( ,0) g g s l p p ³  
(18) ( ,0) ( ,1) b b l s p p ³  
These conditions are indeed the ICCs required for a separating equilibrium. The ICCs 
prevent  Good  firms  from  pretending  to  be  risky  and  also  deter  Bad  firms  from 
mimicking Good firms.  
4.  A model extension on the signalling outcome with the choice of 
debt maturity 
We  move  on  in  this  section  with  verifying  the  signalling  outcome  of  Flannery’s 
(1986) model. To do so, we provide a simple extension based on the same setting as 
has been defined in the previous section. This extension is imperative in attaining the 
feasible signalling separating outcome, which is the  main purpose of a signalling 
model.  As  analyzed  previously,  the  Flannery’s  analysis  regarding  his  signalling 
outcome  ends  at  the  conditions  that  drive  a  separating  equilibrium.  Yet,  these 
conditions  have  been  proven  as  incorrect  incentive  constraints.  Further,  the 
occurrence of a signalling outcome requires more restrictions than just the incentive 
compatibility  constraints.  Theoretically,  the  occurrence  of  a  signalling  separating 
equilibrium  should  satisfy  two  requirements,  in  which  one  ensures  the  incentive 
compatibility  while  the  other  guarantees  the  existence  of  separation.  The  first 
requirement  has  been  fulfilled  by  introducing  the  correct  incentive  compatibility 
constraints to the Flannery’s separating equilibrium. For the second requirement, we 
need to validate the existence of a signalling separating equilibrium by ruling out 
possible pooling equilibria.  
4.1 Ruling out the Conceivable Pooling Equilibria 
In  the  framework  of  Flannery’s  model,  there  are  two  candidates  for  a  pooling 
equilibrium, a pooling possibility where both types of firms borrow short-term debt 
and a pooling possibility where both types of firms borrow long-term debt.    16
A pooling equilibrium only exists only if it is upheld by an out-of-equilibrium belief 
(Bolton  and  Dewatripont, 2005,  p.105).  For  a  certain  pooling  possibility,  if there 
exists a condition under which Bad firms tend to deviate from a pooling possibility no 
matter what the market believes, such a pooling strategy is not qualified as a pooling 
equilibrium.  
We  first  consider  the  short  pooling  possibility.  Bad  firms  deviate  from  the  short 
pooling strategy and choose long-term debt instead, if the following condition holds.  
(19) ( ,0) ( , ) b b l s p p q ³  
Observing a deviating action from the short pooling possibility, the market may infer 
a type as Bad firms ( ) 0 i t l r = = . This is indeed the least favourable out-of-equilibrium 
belief of the market with respect to Bad firms. If Bad firms obtain a higher equity 
value under this belief, they do so in all other beliefs. Therefore, the short pooling 
equilibrium  does  not  exist  if  condition  (19)  is  satisfied.  Note  that  in  Flannery’s 
analysis,  this  condition  is  treated  as  an  incentive  constraint  for  Bad  firms  at  his 
separating equilibrium (condition (12) on his page 29). We have proven that this 
condition precludes the short pooling possibility and thereby justifying the existence 
of the separating equilibrium.  
We now look at the long pooling possibility. Assuming the same out-of-equilibrium 
belief as in the short pooling case, that is ( ) 0 i t s r = =  , Bad firms will not deviate from 
this  pooling,  given  that  they  certainly  achieve  a  higher  equity  value  at  the  long 
pooling possibility than deviating from the pooling, i.e. they choose short-term debt 
instead. 
(20)  ( ,0) ( , ) b b s l p p q £  
This condition always holds true, supporting the existence of the pooling equilibrium.  
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Proof 
It is straightforward to see that (20) always holds:  
( ,0) ( ,0) b b s l p p £ :  Short-term  debt  is  more  costly  than  long-term  debt  at 
separation  
and  ( ,0) ( , ) b b l l p p q £ :  For  Bad  firms  long-term  debt  at  separation  is  more 
profitable than at a pooling possibility . So  ( ,0) ( , ) b b s l p p q £ is always true. 
 4.2 Refining the Long Pooling Equilibrium. 
We now carefully consider the long pooling equilibrium with respect to its stability. It 
is argued that some pooling equilibria may not be stable under certain refinements 
and  thus  should  be  ruled  out.    In  this  analysis,  we  apply  the  so-called  Intuitive 
Criterion (IC)(Cho and Kreps, 1987) to refine the long pooling equilibrium. More 
specifically, we conduct conditions under which the long pooling equilibrium does 
not satisfy the Intuitive Criterion. By definition, under the IC, if a firm i could not 
benefit from the out-of-equilibrium action no matter what beliefs were held by the 
market, the market’s belief must put zero probability on that type (Rasmusen, 2001).  
The long pooling equilibrium is characterized as follows. Both types choose long-
term debt g b t t l = = . Rationally, the market infers every firm as a “pooled” type 
( ) i t r q =  and hence charges the pooling loan rate of Rlp to all borrowing firms.  An 
out-of-equilibrium belief that upholds this pooling is ( ) 0 i t s r = = .  Under this belief, 
no firm will deviate from the long pooling equilibrium to switch to short-term debt, 
given  the  signalling  cost  they  must  pay  and  the  lower  payoff  they  will  obtain 
( ( ,0) ( , ) i i s l p p q £ ). Therefore, the long pooling equilibrium pooling exists under 
the market’s belief as specified.    18
By introducing the Intuitive Criterion, we will consider whether or not such a belief is 
reasonable. If a certain condition exists such that the specified belief is not intuitive, 
the long pooling equilibrium does not survive the Intuitive Criterion and thus will be 
precluded.   
For both types of firms, the only option to deviate from the long pooling is to choose 
short-term debt, which imposes the transaction cost on firms. As to Good firms, by 
deviating  they  wish  to  convince  the  market  to  believe  in  their  true  quality.  So, 
deviation is a desirable choice for Good firms if the following condition holds: 
(21)  ( ,1) ( , ) g g s l p p q ³   
As for Bad firms, by deviating they wish to fool the market into believing them as a 
Good type. Bad firms will be indifferent about pooling and deviating if the following 
condition holds:  
(22)  ( ,1) ( , ) b b s l p p q £  
The combination of (21) and (22) is referred as the Intuitive Criterion that justifies the 
stability  of  the  long  pooling  equilibrium.  Effectively,  if  (21)  and  (22)  hold 
simultaneously,  Good  firms  are  able to  convince  the  market  that they  are indeed 
better off by the out-of-equilibrium action while Bad firms are not. In order to support 
a  deviating  action  by  good  firms,  the  reasonable  out-of-equilibrium  belief  of  the 
market  should  be  ( ) 1 i t s r = = .  In  other  words,  the  out-of-equilibrium  belief  as 
specified  ( ) 0 i t s r = = in the pooling definition appears to be unreasonable. Hence, the 
long pooling equilibrium fails to meet the Intuitive Criterion and should be precluded. 
It should be noted that, in his analysis, Flannery considers our condition (21) (or his 
condition  (14)  analogously)  as  the  incentive  constraint  for  Good  firms  to  choose 
short-term debt over long-term debt.    19
4.3 The Feasible Signalling Outcome 
The feasible incentive compatible separating equilibrium will result if the separating 
equilibrium is both incentive compatible and feasible. In other words, the conditions 
implied by the Incentive Compatibility Constraint and the conditions that rule out the 
pooling equilibria including the Intuitive Criterion should be satisfied. So, combining 
the conditions (17) to (22), exclusive of (20)
3, we establish the following result. 
Result 1:  A signalling separating equilibrium under which Good firms signal by 
borrowing costly short-term debt while Bad firms borrow long-term debt will arise 
under the following condition: 
(23) ( ,1) ( , )











The first equation is retrieved from the condition under the Intuitive Criterion for 
Good firm, inducing Good firms to resign from the long pooling equilibrium. The 
second equation  is  obtained  from  the  condition  under  the  Incentive  Compatibility 
Constraint for Bad firms, restricting the incentive of Bad firms’ to mimic the Good 
type.  
Proof: Appendix A 
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S
lb V  are the equity values for Good firms and Bad firms under the separating 
equilibrium where Good firms borrow short and Bad firms borrow long. 
P
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equity value for Good firms under the long pooling equilibrium and 
mimic
sb V is the 
putative equity value of Bad firms as they mimic the Good type in the long pooling 
strategy.  Fitting  all  the  relevant  terms  defined  in  section  2,  the  system  can  be 
simplified to the following condition denoted as C2: 















C p p DR D p M
- -
= -
= - - + -
 
Condition C2 implies that costs of short-term debt should be higher than a certain 
threshold to make it unattractive for Bad firms to mimic Good firms at a signalling 
separating equilibrium, and should be lower than another threshold to motivate Good 
firms to incur a costly signalling behaviour.   
4.4 The Impact of Reconsidering the Signalling Outcome 
We have proven that in the presence of asymmetric information on firm quality, and 
of  transaction  cost  for  short-term  debt,  a  signalling  outcome  with  Good  firms 
borrowing short will occur if C2 holds. In this section, we will examine to what 
extent our condition C2 differs from the condition C1 under which Flannery claims 
that a financial signalling equilibrium will be attained. For a comparison purpose, we 
rewrite both conditions here: 
C1  C c C l h £ £   and C2 C c C d h £ £  
where 
2 (2 ) (1 ) 5 C p p DR D p M h g g lP g = - - + -    21











= -  
Both conditions converge with respect to their upper boundary, i.e. Ch. Regarding the 
lower boundaries, we have0 l d C C £ £ , irrespective of other parameters   
Proof: Appendix B 
Therefore, a parameter space under C2 is clearly more restrictive than that under C1. 
As a consequence, the introduction of C2 restricts the occurrence of the separating 
signalling outcome as suggested by Flannery.  
In  summary,  our  extension  brings  out  an  important  implication  to  the  signalling 
outcome of the Flannery’s model. The conditions for the occurrence of a signalling 
equilibrium now become more stringent with respect to the lower threshold of the 
extra cost of short-term debt. Thus, it will be less likely that debt maturity can be used 
as a signalling instrument than argued by Flannery (1986). 
5.  Conclusions 
This paper verifies the signalling role of debt maturity by means of investigating the 
well-know  signalling  model  “Asymmetric  Information  and  Risky  Debt  Maturity 
Choice” by Flannery (1986). We emphasize the relevance of incentive compatibility 
and of the refinements of pooling equilibria in deriving a separating equilibrium. In 
addition to a review on Flannery’s (1986) model, we have first demonstrated that the 
analysis of Flannery suffers from an important omission in that he does not consider 
the  incentive  compatibility  constraints  for  his  separating  equilibrium.  We  have 
addressed  this  drawback  by  adding  the  incentive  compatibility  constraints  to 
Flannery’s  model.  We  have  later  argued  that  a  signalling  outcome  is  not  yet 
warranted given our correct incentive compatibility constraints. We then provided an 
extension to the Flannery’s model where we focused on the occurrence of a signalling   22
outcome. We do so by considering the existence of separating equilibria in addition to 
the incentive compatibility constraints. We proved that the condition, for which a 
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APPENDIX A: Proof of Result 1 
The  feasible  incentive  compatible  separating  equilibrium  requires  the  following 
conditions to hold 
(17) ( ,1) ( ,0)
(18) ( ,0) ( ,1)
(19) ( ,0) ( , )
(21) ( ,1) ( , )























Recall that (17) and (18) refer to the ICCs required for a separating equilibrium; (19) 
guarantees the non-existence of a certain pooling equilibrium, (21) and (22) represent 
the IC, which justify the stability of the long pooling equilibrium.  
Given that  ( , ) ( ,0) g g l l p q p ³ , i.e. for Good firms, the equity value generated at the 
long pooling possibility is always greater than the value of pretending as Bad firms at 
the separating possibility. Therefore, condition (17) always holds if condition (21) 
holds. As a result, condition (17) drops out of the system.  
Similarly, we have    ( ,1) ( , ) b b s s p p q ³  since the reverse holds for Bad firms, i.e. Bad 
firms choose mimicking Good firms at the separating possibility rather than staying at 
the short pooling possibility. Therefore, condition (19) always holds if condition (18) 
holds. As a result, condition (19) drops out of the system. 
In  addition,  we  also  have ( , ) ( ,0) b b l l p q p ³ ,  i.e.  for  Bad  firms;  the  equity  value 
generated at the long pooling possibility is always greater than the true value at a 
separating possibility. Thus, condition (22) is unbinding as long as condition (18) 
holds. As a result, condition (22) drops out of the system. 
Excluding (17), (19) and (22), the system can now be reduced to: 
( ,1) ( , )
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APPENDIX B: Proof 0 C C l d £ £  











= -  
Where 
2 2 ( (1 ) ) (1 ) (1 )(1 ) 5
(1 ) (1 )(1 )
D D p p M p p g b g b
RsP
D p p p p g g b b
q q q q
q q
￿ ￿ - + - - - + - - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ =
￿ ￿ - + - - ￿ ￿
 
One can see that  RsPis a decreasing function of q . Given that q  is the proportion of 
Good firms in the market, a rise in q  will reduce the level of riskiness of the entire 
pool of borrowers. Accordingly, the pooling interest rate charged by the market will 
decrease.  
Since Cl is a decreasing function of RsP, Cl  increases in q .  
With  0 q » ,  2 (1 ) 5
(1 )




 , leading to Cl  
2 (1 ) 2 5 (1 ) (1 ) 5 (1 )
D Dp M p b b C D p M p D p p D l b b b b D p p b b
- - -
= - - - - -
-
=0 
With  1 q » , we have 
2 (1 ) (1 ) 5 5
(1 )
D M p D Dp M p g g g RsP D p p Dp g g g
￿ ￿ - - - - - ￿ ￿ = =
-
, Cl will converge to 
Cd 
(1 ) ( )(1 ) 5 2 (1 ) (1 ) ( ) 5 5
D M p p p p g g b b C D p M p D p p D D M C l b b b b d Dp p g g
￿ ￿ - - - - ￿ ￿ = - - - - - = - º .  
So  0￿Cl ￿ Cd. is proved. 
 